Law and Economics: A Feminist Economist's Critique by McFarland, Joan
LAW AND ECONOMICS: A FEMINIST 
ECONOMIST’S CRITIQUE
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From a feminist standpoint, law and economics suffers from the same biases as 
neo-classical economics. It relies on a market approach which prioritizes efficiency 
over equity. Furthermore, the analysis is not sensitive to the gender impact of 
policy measures. This paper outlines the efficiency (Pareto optimal) conditions of 
a market approach and the implications of such an approach for women. It then 
offers some specific suggestions for a feminist critique of law and economics.
I. The Conditions for Pareto Optimality
The area of law and economics is the application of neo-classical micro-economic 
theory to the area of law. I specify “neo-classical” because there is not just one 
school of economics. Neo-classical economics is basically market economics, that 
is, the approach which extols the virtues of a free market. Within neo-classical 
economics, there are conservative and liberal variants. This is pertinent because 
some of the law and economics literature cites economists such as Milton 
Friedman and F. A. Hayek who are of the extreme conservative persuasion.
The argument put forward by neo-classical economists for the free reign of the 
market rests on claims of the efficiency of the market over other allocative 
mechanisms. However, the case for this efficiency is at a theoretical level. The 
theoretical models of the discipline are based on numerous assumptions of 
questionable validity in the real world. Neo-classical economists outline these 
assumptions and the problems associated with them but then proceed with the 
analysis regardless.
How is economic efficiency defined? Efficiency is defined as a Pareto optimal 
state, a position from which no one can be made better off without making 
someone else worse off. The attainment of Pareto optimality requires the 
satisfaction of an array of marginal conditions in the goods and services markets, 
in the factor markets, and in production. These conditions are usually defined for 
a two-consumer, two-commodity, and two-firm world but must be extended to the 
whole of the economy for Pareto optimality to exist.1 Pareto optimality has no 
m eaning in a partial equilibrium sense.
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Not only do these marginal conditions have to be satisfied, but also the 
analysis must be based on numerous assumptions, few of which would be possible 
to satisfy in the real world.2 Pareto optimality is not just one position for the 
economy. It is a whole array of outcomes each having a different income 
distribution.3 Most economists find it difficult to go beyond this array of Pareto 
optimal positions, because to do so would necessarily require value judgments. 
The definition of efficiency used in economics thus has a very specific meaning, 
and this has many implications. It is not just your commonplace “efficiency” 
which seems reasonable to most people.
How is “equity” defined in this model? “Equity” is achieved when marginal 
conditions in the factor markets for land, labour and capital are satisfied. Under 
marginal productivity theory, equilibrium is achieved where each factor receives 
the value of its marginal product, supposedly its contribution to production.4 This 
analysis completely ignores the actual structure of factor markets by assuming that 
all markets are perfectly competitive. It also fails to include all those who are not 
involved in any factor market as either owner or paid worker. As well, the model 
takes as given the initial endowment of factors.3 On the one hand, those using the 
approach do not like to make value judgments. They consider their approach 
scientific and non-ideological. On the other hand, they accept the status quo as 
a meaningful starting point, which in itself embodies an ideological position.
To summarize, the main problem with the direction of law and economics is 
its rapture with the concept of efficiency, as used by neo-classical economists. 
Economic theory idealizes efficiency but ignores goals of equity. Neo-classical 
economists avoid equity issues because those might involve value judgements. 
Thus, for anyone who would place equity before efficiency, neo-classical economics 
would have, at best, a limited usefulness.
The law is not the only area that is trying to incorporate neo-classical 
economic thought. For example, there has been an invasion of neo-classical 
economic theory in the area of social policy reform.6 The government is not 
listening to social policy analysts anymore. It is listening to neo-classical
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economists. In fact, the spread of neo-classical economics into other areas has 
been noted by others and has even been given a name: economic imperialism.7
II. Implications of an Efficiency Approach for Women
Females have never been prominent within the economics discipline. There are 
few famous women economists. There are few female economists in academia. 
A female presence is lacking in economics articles and texts. A few years ago, I 
did a survey of economics journals in the Harriet Irving Library, of the University 
of New Brunswick. Of the seventy-one issues of thirty-one journals from the neo­
classical paradigm that I examined, only nine articles dealt with what could be 
broadly described as women’s issues.8 Only one was written by a woman. In a 
1986 survey done by the Social Sciences Federation of Canada, the Canadian 
Economics Association reported “zero” articles “specifically on women’s issues” 
among the ninety-six articles published in their journal in the period between 1982- 
84.9
A 1990 American article examined the treatment of women in twenty-one 
introductory economics texts. Looking for “topics of special salience to women”, 
it found on average 10.38 pages in texts of an average length of 810 pages. In 
percentage terms, this was 1.36% of the content. A comparison of first editions 
of texts with revised editions showed an insignificant increase from 1.26% to 
1.40%.10 It is apparent that women have not been the subject of economics or 
participated to any significant extent in the discipline. Perhaps it is not surprising 
that the discipline has not seen the world from female eyes.
Neo-classical economics starts from the supposedly generic notion of 
“economic man”. The first step in achieving Pareto optimality is to define the 
preferences of this “economic man” who is assumed to have insatiable wants. 
Hence, scarcity is inherent in the system. Given the opportunity, “he” will always 
choose more over less. In other words “economic man” is motivated by greed. 
Such a narrow view of human nature is a questionable starting point of analysis. 
One new left critic maintains:
Economists have postulated a rotten world and have set about to see under what
circumstances it might be good, subject to the unchallenged constraining postulate
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(that wants are insatiable) which makes it rotten to begin with. Welfare 
economists are living contradictions, all by themselves.11
Another major conceptual critique is that neo-classical economists, by focusing 
on the market, ignore the private sphere in favour of the public sphere. Indeed, 
neo-classical economics has traditionally neglected the household sphere. 
Recently, however, certain neo-classical economists have entered the household 
sphere using market tools of analysis. Yet their analysis “simply takjes] us around 
the vicious circle that we want to have explained.”12 There have also been recent 
writings from the field of law and economics in areas such as surrogate 
motherhood which are critiqued for similar reasons.13
Neo-classical economists consider economics to be a science, such as physics 
or chemistry, which is thus objective and value-free. Accordingly, economists have 
formalized their theoretical and empirical analyses with mathematical and 
econometric models. This methodological approach is in stark contrast to feminist 
methodology. Feminist methodology values qualitative research, is explicit in its 
value judgments, starts from experience rather than unrealistic assumptions, and 
is highly sensitive to the relationship between the researcher and the 
“researched”.14
Recent feminist critique of economics has also stressed the non gender-neutral 
impact of economic policy.15 Policies are designed by economists and 
governments without regard for their impact in terms of gender. A number of 
examples from the current social policy review illustrate the outcomes of this 
approach. The recent proposed unemployment insurance changes were initiated 
at the urging of neo-classical economists as a way of making the program more 
efficient. These proposed changes will have an impact on the lives of many 
Canadians — specifically those who lose their jobs and most severely on those who 
do not have steady jobs, those whom the government labels “frequent users”. 
What is not explicit and perhaps has not even been considered at the policy 
making level is that the majority of “frequent users” are women.16 Women 
comprise the majority of those who are in part-time and/or short-term jobs. They
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also constitute a significant portion of seasonal workers such as fishplant workers 
and workers in the tourism industry.
There are numerous other examples of the non gender-neutral impact of 
policies. The job-creation impact of infrastructure projects is often to provide jobs 
for males and not for females. Further, social security “reform” will result in an 
increase in the unpaid labour of women as women compensate for the reduction 
in services to the household. For example, the de-institutionalization of health 
care, in practical terms, is a cut in women’s paid work in favour of increased 
unpaid caretaker work for women at home. This social security “reform” will 
create a greater polarization among different groups of women and will also have 
a negative impact on equity policies for women and other traditionally 
marginalized groups. Such examples underscore the unconscious, although 
possibly deliberate, gender blindness with which policy makers and analysts, many 
of whom are neo-classical economists, formulate such options.
III. Some Suggestions for a Feminist Critique of Law and Economics
The feminist critiques of economics outlined thus far are applicable to the area of 
law and economics. Although mathematical model building and econometric 
testing have not been developed within the discipline of law and economics, its 
conceptualization and its policies are nonetheless equally unlikely to have a 
gender-neutral impact. I would like to end my remarks by suggesting a few areas 
where the impact of such policies would be anything but gender neutral.
I am certain that issues of equity are of primary concern to feminists in law. 
Such issues include equality of opportunity, equality of employment, a just 
distribution of income and wealth, and the recognition of unpaid work. How can 
these issues be addressed given a theory which takes as a starting point given 
endowments or, in other words, a given distribution of wealth? If these issues are 
not addressed and efficiency remains the predominant goal of the law and 
economics discipline while issues of equity are ignored, then women will be 
seriously harmed.
Equal pay for work of equal value is a good example. Equal pay policies have 
been proposed and implemented because of historic, systemic inequities in pay for 
men and women. Women in Canada are still earning only 69 cents for every Si 
earned by men.17 However, any effort to compensate women for past inequities 
and raise their pay up to the level earned by men doing the same work and 
holding the same qualifications necessitates market intervention. Market-oriented 
economists reject such policies for just this reason. Those working in the area of
17This is based on full time average earnings from the 1991 census as reported in A. Freeman, “Wage 
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economics and law who adopt such a market-oriented approach, may tend to 
reject such policies as well On the other hand, advocates of equal pay for equal 
work policies point out that efficiency is not attained by free labour markets 
anyway because real labour markets do not satisfy the conditions required by 
Pareto optimality.1* The issue of equal pay f(» equal work remains a classic 
example of the debate regarding the appropriate prioritization of efficiency and 
equity.
A basic application of neo-classical economic analysis provides the rationale 
for the commodification of all goods and services as well as the enhancement of 
private property rights.19 The argument made is that privatization maximizes 
efficiency by minimizing social costs and maximizing social benefits. However, 
when I think of property as it may concern women, I am reminded of the 1985 
Nairobi UN Decade of Women conference theme: “Women and girls are one half 
of the world’s population; women do two-thirds of the world’s work, receive one- 
tenth of the world’s income, and own less than one hundredth of the world’s 
property.”20 Hence I would fear the impact of enhanced property rights on the 
lives of women.
With reference to the commodification of all goods and services, perhaps 
feminists should encourage the extension of this principle to the household sphere 
so that everything that a woman does in the household could be given a price. 
This, according to property rights theory, would marimize. social benefits and 
minimize social costs. Yet, one might wonder if it would do anything for relations 
in the family, which one might hope could be the last bastion of sharing and 
caring. This is an area of inquiry where neo-classical economics has little to 
contribute. Nonetheless, those working in the area of law and economics have 
indeed examined the area of sociological phenomena with respect to such issues 
as marriage, divorce, surrogacy and prostitution. This has introduced a market- 
oriented, efficiency approach to the study of these areas which may be as 
inappropriate and as dangerous to women as such a market-oriented approach has 
been when applied to the private sphere by neo-classical economists.
A final area which has a substantial bearing on law and economics, is the idea 
of freedom of contract, one of the cornerstones of a free market. A neo-classical 
economics postulate is that parties entering into an exchange do so voluntarily. 
Would this apply to the vast bulk of women workers? Do women “choose” their
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role in the labour force or do they accept it because of the lack of other choices? 
Maijorie Cohen, a feminist economist, suggests: “Women, for most of the history 
of industrialized countries, have been restricted from access to all but a handful 
of jobs, so freedom of contract cannot be seen as ever having applied to the 
condition of female labour.*'21 I hope that others who care about these i«nf-s will 
consider these critiques and keep a cautious eye out for the effects of “economic 
imperialism” in this and other areas of law.
2l“The Problem of Studying Economic Man” in G. Finn & A. Miles, eds., Feminism in Canada 
(Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1982) 89 at 98.
